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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
WESTERN STATES REFINING
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-·vs.J3LAIR BERRY,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No. 8602

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
As stated by Appellant, this action was commenced
on June 7, 1956, by the service upon the Defendant of a
"ten day" Summons. Thereafter, the Complaint was filed
in the District Court of Davis County in which it is alleged that Defendant had breached a certain contract
theretofore entered into between him and the Plaintiff in that he failed to purchase all of the petroleum products required by him from the Plaintiff; that he transferred fron1 the serviee station owned by the Plaintiff
various customers and accounts to another station owned
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by the Defendant. It also alleged that Defendant had
assigned certain credit card charges to Plaintiff with
recourse and that the same had not been paid so that the
out.standing balance in the sum of $2,592.15 was owing
by Defendant to Plaintiff. Plaintiff further sought to
recover rent owing upon the service station leased by it
to the Defendant (R. 2, 3, 4).
Instead of answering the Complaint, Defendant filed
a motion to quash the service of Summons upon the
ground that "the Plaintiff, through its agents, obtained
the service of said Summons on the Defendant by inveigling or enticing the Defendant into the jurisdiction of the
above-entitled Court by deceit, artifice or trick." (R. 7).
Thereafter, at the time of the hearing of said motion,
the Defendant added an additional ground for quashing
the service of Summons "for the reason that the Defendant was, at the time of the service of said Summons, iinmune fron1 the service of process by the Plaintiff in relation to the subject of this action." (R. 9).
I~etween

the time of filing the motion to quash and
the hearing thereof by the Court, Defendant had taken
th(\ deposition of three n1en1bers of the organization of
tlv~ Plaintiff Co1npnny: \)T. F. -\Vagstaff, President
:-.~ eal R. Olson, General S.a1es l\fanager, and Richard G-.
}~oren, an e1nployce of the Sales Department~ "Tho at
th(\ tin1e \vns also acting as attorney for the Co1npany.
Defendant also took t1H~ deposition of R.oyal . A_. Reynolds,
1fnrshall of North Salt Lake, \Yho had served the Surnlnons upon the Defendant. Apparently after taking the
l'oregoin~ depositions, Defendant realized that the clni1n
of "invei~ling or <'ntiring the Defendant into the Stat0
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of Utah by deceit, artifice or trick" was not well.founaea
thereby necessitating the general claim that Defendant
was immune from service at the time that process was
in fact served upon hirn. Although the first ·ground of
the motion \VaS not entirely .abandoned at the time "of the
hearing, Defendant has now apparently \Vaived it by
conceding in his Brief that the trial court resolved the
issues of fact against De fen d.ant, by its determination
that the service of process was good.
Although AppellHnt has set forth with clarity most
of the facts in respect to the rnatteT now before the
Court, some conflicts in the evidence exist that should
l;8 pointed out. The Defendant, ]\{(r. Berry, testified that
rJl he \Vas advised by ~,{r. Boren was that "he wanted me
to come to Salt Lake to go over my accounts, which they
figured was delinquent, and a fevv other matters that
they 'vanted to t~alk over while I w.as there." (R. 14, 15).
Mr. Berry further testified that he told Mr. Boren that
he vvrould be down on the 6th or the 7th o~ June (R. 16).
On the other hand, l\ir. Boren testified that he talked to
::·:Ir. Ber:ry and asked hirn \vhen he would be able to come
uo\vn? and n1r. Berry said ''1le \Vas very busy, and he
didn't l~now wheth::-~r or not he ~would be able to co1nu
do\vn and talk to then1 ;" (R. 63) "that he didn't know
\Yhether he would corne down, but it 1night be the first
of the fol1o"'.ving week," (R. ()~-). Mr. Berry refused to
state when he \Vould COlile down. Mr. Boren rGplif'~~,
··~.Fell t 11e11, if you like make it .at your O"\vn convenienc.".
\V 0, "\'11~1 rnect \Vith you on s~atnrJay or Sunday or a~1Y
r~~f' yo-:1 s~_y." Thereupon J\llr. Berry said '"I cnn't tell
.\-on (ief~nit~l~~. Probabl7 Thursday or Friday." .1.\ncl
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that was the way it was left. As a matter of fact Mr.
Bore·n stated he was surprised when he came into the
office the morning after his return from Idaho and Mr.
Berry arrived (R. 65).
One of the first things that happened after the conference began rut the offices of Plaintiff Company was
that Mr. Wagstaff, President of the Company, came in
and stated, "As far as I am concerned, why I would sue
you. I wouldn't monkey wi,th you. But if you can make
some sort of agreement with these boys - meaning
Neal ~and Dick - why that is fine with me. But as far
as I a1n concerned, I have 'va.sted all the time coaxing you
that I a1n going to and trying to meet your demands."
With that Mr. Wagstaff left the room (R. 42). Later on,
Mr. Wagstaff directed Mr. Boren to prepare a Summons
in order that a suit might be instituted before ~Ir. Berry
]eft if no agreement 'vas reached (R. 43). 1\fr. Berry first
admitted that Mr. \Vagstaff had stated that he \vould
just as soon sue him as not, but then later stated that he
had no recollection thereof (R. 27, 28).
Both Mr. Boren and I\Ir. Olsen testified that an
an·rcen1ent w·a3 tentatively
. reached "ith ~Ir. Berrv. and
that he left the roon1 and \vent out and discussed the
\natter \vith his \vife. "\\~hen he returned he then made
son1e changes .and denulnds \Yhich could not be met by
the Plaintiff, " hereupon l\Ir. Olson indicated that if
nothing was worked out they \Yonld have to sue 1\rfr.
Berry. J\ifr. Berry then replied, ""\'7 ell, you go ahead and
sue 1ne, if you want. I don't care. You do \vhatever you
please." (R. 53, 61, 62). It \vas at that point that the
1\f ar~hall ,v.as railed in to serve the Sumn1ons (R. 61).
('

7
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
The only point raised on appeal is whether the Defendant was immune from service of Summons at the
time the Summons \Vas served upon him.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
DEFENDANT vV AS NOT IMMUNE FROM SERVICE OF
SUMMONS.

Irt must be pointed out that the issue presented to
this Court is one of law, ina.s1nuch as the trial court found
the factual issues against the Defendant .and in favor
of the Plaintiff. In determining \vhether the trial court
properly overruled Appellant's motion all intendments
are in favor of the ruling and the burden is upon Appellant to satisfy this court th.at as a matter of lavv the lower
court was in error. Franklin v. Superior Court, 98 Cal.
A pp. 2d 292, 220 P. 2d 8.
Defendant's contention is that he came into the State
of Utah at the invitation of the Plaintiff "for the sole
purpose of conferring with the Plaintiff in regard to the
settlen1ent of a theD existing controversy" and for that
reason was immune frorn servi~e during the time he vvas
here. In support of this contention, Appellant relies upon
the decision of the Supreme Court of Montana in the case
of State ex rel Ellan v. District Court of Eighth Judicial
JJistrict, 97 ~~font. 229, 33 P. 2d 526, 93 A.L.R. 865. !Io\vever, the decision of lvfontana Supreme Court stands
olon(~ a.nd is not supported by reason or by authority in
any other jurjsdiction.
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The general rule is that if personal service of process
is procurre~d by fraud, trickery, or- artifice, it will not
be sufficient to give the court jurisdiction of the person
thus served. This rule applies irrespective of whether
the Defendant is a resident or non-resident of the state
or county where the service of process is made, although
it is usually found to apply in instances where a nonresident of rthe state is served with process while in another state. A general discussion of the matter is contained in 42 Am. Jur., "PROCESS" Sec. 35, p. 32, where
th~ rule is stated thusly:
"Thus, if a person resident outside the jurisdiction of the court and the reach of its process
is inveigled, enticed, or induced, by any false representation, deceitful contrivance, or wrongful
device for 'vhich the Plaintiff is responsible, to
come 'vithin the jurisdiction of the court for the
purpose of obtaining service of process on him
in an action brought against hin1 in such court,
process sel\'"ed upon hin1 through such improner
means is invalid, and upon proof of such fact
the court 'vill, on motion, set it aside. This principle has been applied generally to the Defendant's
property as well as to his person. The rule applie~
also where the presence of the Defendant within
the jurisdirtj on of the court has been procured by
force, or by abuse of criminal process. Thus, although the authorities are not harn1onious in respect of the right of a nonresident Defendant in a
criminal case to iln1nunity fro1n the service of civil
process, there seen1s to be no dissent from the
proposition that rightful jurisdiction cannot be
acquired by the iinproper use of the criminal
process of a state; .and consequently, where the
attendance has been procured by an arre.st caused
for thP sole purpose of securing jurisdiction so
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that the Defendant may be served with civil
process, the courts will set aside the service. Howeve.r, the n1ere fact that the person causing the
Defendant to be brought into the jurisdiction for
the trial of a criminal offen.se is .also the person
at whose instance the civil action is instituted
does not itself sho'v bad faith in procuring the return of the accused. And no bad faith can be
predicated upon the fact that the criminal prosecution was instituted by the Plaintiff in the civil
action when it .appears that the Defendant had
been a resident of the state for some two weeks
prior to the in.stitution of the criminal proceeding, and so could have been served 'vith civil
process without e1nploying the aid of any cri1ninal
prosecution."
In de~tern1inin.7 \vhut evidence is sufficient to shovv
fraud and fraudulent ]ntent or purpose An1. Jur. furt~:cr states: (Ibid. Sec. 36, p. 33)

"Fraud and fraudulent intent and purpose
in enticing .a person to come \vithin the reach of
the process of a court m~ay be inferred from the
acts and repre.sentations of the p·arties ·and all
the facts and circumstances sho,vn. But, as bet,veen honest and dishonest n1otives and purposes~
honesty of intent an~1 purpose v1ill be pre:3~1::.l12:·l
unless the facts and circninstan(l(':ls .are such as to
satisfy the mind that the acts and statements relied on are fra1Hlnlent or dj sl1onc\r< ·~. The scr·'.Ti r0
of a writ, other\vise lawful, does not be"oine nnla\vful because the hope for a chance to n1ake
it was the sole motive for other .acts tending to
create the chance, whieh other acts \vould thernr,elve.s have been lawful except for that hope.
~,Tor is fraud predieable of conduct by n10ans of'
\Yhieh th0, Plaintiff has merely taken ndvant~gr
of th0 n:\nn1 conrse of hnsjness.''
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In the case of Jaster v. Currie, 198 U.S. 144, 25 Sup.
Ct. 614, 49 L. Ed. 988, the problem of what constitutes
fraud or trickery was directly before the court. There
the Plaintiff in error (Jaster) had originally filed an
action in Nebraska against the Defendant. In connection
with such action a notice of a taking of a deposition in
Ohio was given to the Defendant through his attorney.
The Defendant went to Ohio for the purpose of attending
aJt the time the deposition 'vas taken, whereupon he was
served with a Summons in a similar action brought
against him in Ohio. l-Ie appeared specially in the Ohio
action and moved to set aside the service but his motion
\Vas denied. This decision of the trial court was affirmed in 66 Ohio State 661, 65 N.E. 1127. Thereafter, judgment was taken against him and subsequently an action
on the Ohio judgment \vas fjled in ~~ ebraska. }~gain the
Defendant appeared ana clai1ned that the judgment in
Ohio had been taken against hlin by reason of fraud
perpetrated upon hiln in the original service of summons.
Th<> Supren1e Court of Nebraska a.ffirn1ed the decision
of the trial court to the effect that there was fraud and
dismissed~ the action, \Yhereupon the Plaintiff appealed
to the Supre111e Court of the lTnited States. In posing
the question to be decided by it, the Supren1e Court
stated:
"If the inducement to enter the Sta.te of Ohio
furnished by· the notice to take a deposition there
was 1nade fraudulent bv the n1otiYes bY \vhich t]u~
notice v;as given, then there \Vas fraud·: other"iS('~
there was not. On the face of the answer fraud
is silnply the pleader's conclusion fron1 the snecific facts. The question is "~hether the 1notiv~ a1h\.!.;0rl ran have the effect supposed."

10
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In determining that the service of process 'vas not
obtained by fraud (and reversing the decision of the
Nebraska Suprerne Court), the Supreme Court of the
lTnited States stated:
"It will be observed that there vvas no misrepresentation, express or implied, with regard
to anything, even the n1otives of the Plaintiff. The
paDties were at arm's length. The Plaintiff did
not say or in1ply that he had one motive rather
than another. He sin1ply did a lav1ful act by all
the po,vers enabling him to do it, and that was all.
Therefore the \vord 'fr.aud' 1nay be discarded as
inappropriate. The question is whether the service of a writ, otherwise lawful, becomes unlawful
because the hope for a chance to make it was the
sole motive for other acts tending to create the
chance, which other acts would themselves have
been lawful but for that hope. We assume that
motives may make a difference in liability. But
the usual cases where they have been held to do
so have been cases where the i1nmediate and ex-pected effect of the act done was to inflict da1nage,
and where therefore, as a matter of substantive
law, if not of pleading, the act w.as thought to
need a justification (see Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195
U.S. 194, 204, ante, 154, 159, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 3),
or else where the intent was to do a further and
unlawful act to which the act done wa.s the means.
Swift v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396, ante,
518, 524, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 276.
"It is hard to exhaust the possibilities of a
general proposition. Therefore it m.ay be dangerous to say that doing an act lawful in itself as
a means of doing another act lawful in itself
cannot mhke a wrong by the combination. It is
enough to say that it does not usually ha"'l:'r tl~at
result, and that the case at bar is not an rxcrp-
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tion to the general rule. We must take the allegations of the answer to be true, although they are
manifestly absurd. The Plaintiff could not have
known that the Defendant's lawyer would advise
him to go to Ohio, and that the Defendant would
go to his father's house, instead of to N ebra.ska,
when his business was over. But we assume, as
far as possible, that the anticipation of these
things was the sole inducement for giving the
notice and taking the deposition. Still the notice
was true, and the taking of the deposition needed
no justification. It could be taken arbitrarily, because the Plaintiff chose. On the other hand, the
Defendant could be served with process if he sa-\v
fit to linger in Ohio. That also the Plaintiff could
do arbitrarily, because he chose, if he thought he
had a case. He arbitrarily could unite the t,,~o
acts, and do the first because he hoped it would
give him a chance to do the last."
The theory of the court in the Ellan case, supra,
appears to be that since by long precedent the courts
have granted i1nmunity to non-r0sident individuals appcarinf!, in a state to attend at the trial or other judicial
proc0edings jn sn~h state, that such in1n1unity should
extend to all 111a tters relr..ting to problen1s of difference
h:ot\v~\~n part-ie!~ Y.~hich 1night h(\ settled outside of the
ronrt. ~rhe fallr~rY of such reasoning is readilv observe<l
"·~1rn th~ h:1~is for tlH~ rule is considered. In the court,~
npjninn npp0:1r~ th0 i\)llO\Ying rtnotntion fron1 FederrJ
.Tnd~~·p ,~nn 1~,l<:'0t in P1r case of Filer v. }lrCorJnick (DC)
~:.:~~) I non~ ~l+:
•

11

L

•

•

''Originally it "Tas ass0rted solely as the privi-

1p_g·p of the court for the protection of its o'Yn
jurisdiction, but later as thn:t of the person ron~Prned aR \\Tell. Baron's Abr. tit. 'Privilege.' What
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the precise limits of the right were in its earlier
history, or those to whom extended, it is not very
material to here inquire. * * * While it is quite
true that the right has most frequently arisen and
been applied in connection with parties and witnesses in judicial proceedings, its extension in the
process of time to those engaged in other departments of the public service has been more largely
by analogous application by the courts than as a
result of legislation."
If, .as stated above, the rule originally can1e into
existence to :protect the eourt in its O\vn jurisdiction, ho-w
can it be said that any social policy is served by allo,ving
L person to be irnrnune from process on the pretext that
has come into the state to engage in a discussion regarding differences which have not even been brought
to the attention of the court~ There is far more reason
to restrict the rule to the situation where the sole purpose of coming into the state is to attend .a trial or other
hearing as a witness, than to extend the immunity from
service of process to a situation vvhere no action has even
been filed. In the case of Franklin v. Superior Court in
and for San Francisco Cotttnty, supra, the court held that
the privilege of exemption from service of process for
persons coming into the jurisdiction for the purpose of
attending court did not extend to persons voluntarily coming within the jurisdiction of the court for the purpose
of consulting with the attorney or investig.a ting the transaction or otherwise .attendi_ng to matters which may be
subject to litigation or which may eventually re·ach a
trial.

he

In Murrey v. Murrey, 216 Cal. 707, 16 P. 2d 741, 85
A.L.R. 1335, the Supreme Court of California refused to
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exempt from s-ervice of process a non-resident reserve
officer of the United States Army temporarily within
the state for the purpose of training as a reserve officer.
The Defendant in that case was admittedly a resident of
the State of Utah, and while on active duty with the 57th
Coast Artillery was served with a Summons and Order
to Show Cause in an action by a minor child to compel
the Defendant, his father, to contribute to the minor's
support. The Defendant relied up·on the language of
Judge Van Fleet in the Filer case, supra, and urged that
on the basis of public policy he should be immune from
service of process while on active duty with the lTnited
States Army. The Supreme Court of California enunciated the following general proposition with respect to
the privilege:
"This exemption from service of process is,
of course, in derogation of the right which every
creditor has to collect his debt by subjecting his
debtor to suit in an-v- iurisdiction where he mav
find him. Since this is so, the privilege should
not be extended bevond the reason of the rule
upon which it is fou~ded. Fitzhugh v. Reid (D. C.)
..

•J

"'

252 F. 234."
The Supren1e Court of California "~ent on to point
out thart in the Filer ca.se. supra, the Defendant was
granted immunity fron1 serY"ice as a 1natter of public
policy because '"he had con1e to this state to perfor1n 'l
public rlut~r during a ti1ne of national e1nergency." (Ibid .
p. 743)
ThP problen1 of in11nnnity from service of process
\vhile n.ttPnding a h0nring in a foreign state as W'"ell as
1mntunit~v fro111 proe<)ss 'rh0r0 attendance in the par-
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ticular state vvas obtained by fraud is thoroughly discussed in the case of Lingo v. Reichenbach Land Company, 225 Iow.a 112, 279 l~.W. 121. There the original
process was served upon an officer of the Reichenbach
Land Company, a corporation, while he was in the s~tate
of Io,va where he had gone for the purpose of attempting
to settle and co:rnprornise an action in ejectment which
had previously been com1nenced by the corporation
against son1e individuals in Iowa. The same attorneys
'.vho represented the defendants in the first action in
connection vvith which 1vfr. Reichenbach had gone to Iovva,
'.verc also attorneys for the plaintiff who co1nmenced
th0 action against the Reichenbach Company. As soon
as Mr. Reichenbach had left the attorney's office (and
before he left the building) .after failing to settle the
ejectment action, the attorneys had service of process
served upon him. The record showed without dispute
that the sole and only purpose of the defendant Reichenback in going to Iowa, was to secure settlement of the
aetion pending in Fremont County, Iowa.
The trial court sustained the special appearance of
the defendant and plaintiff .appealed. In reversing the
decision, the Supreme Court discussed the matter as
follows:
"It is the general and well-recognized rule of
law in this and other states that witnesses and
suitors in attendance on a court outside of the
territorial jurisdiction of their residence are immune from service of civil p-rocess while attending court, and for a re.asonable time before and
after attending said court. (citing numerous
cases)
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"Appellees contend, however, that the rule
granting immunity also extends to cases where a
nonresident is p·resent in the state in which the
action is pending for the good-faith purpose of
attempting a compromis·e or settlement thereof.
The immediate question in this ease therefore is
whether or not Appellee is entitled to immunity
from service of the original notice in the case at
bar while he was in this state for the purpose of
attempting to settle an action pending in an adjoining county.
"We have been cited no cases in this or any
other state in which the rule of immunity from
process had been extended to a case in which the
nonresident is present in this state solely and
only for the purpose of effecting a settlement of
a case pending here. While this precise question
has not been determined in this state, appellee
contends that the same rule of justice granting
immunity· to parties and witnesses attending a
trial also .applies where the party is present in
this .state for the purpose of talking settlement
of an action pending here.
"A nu1nber of cases hold that where a nonresident enters a state at the request of his adversary for the purpose of effecting a compromise or settlen1ent of the caRP, and a notice of
another .action is sPrYed upon hhn 'Yhile in the
foreign state~ i1n1~1nnit:- fron1 serYice "-ill be allo"'"ed the nonresident "~here the evidence tends to
~l1 o'v that he 'vas induced to enter another state
throu,g-h fraud Or had faith. ( (~ites S0Yerrrl eases.
including the J\f ont~na ease of Bllan Y. District
Court 97 1\Tont. lnO. :i;i P.:~d 526~ (1 ~3-t-l)
"An e.'1'fl.Jnin.a.tt~on of thesr cases hnldinn that
n nnurrsidr?lf is rntit1P.d to innnnnif?l frn;J·~ sPr-
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vice in the state of his adversary, will disclose
that the holding was based upon bad faith or
fraud of the adversary in inducing or enticing the
nonresident to enter the foreign state. These
cases announce the rule th.at the question of immunity from service of a process where the nonresident enter.s another state for the purpose of
settling or co1nprornising the action usually turns
upon the question as to whether or not such nonresident was fraudulently or in bad faith induced to come into the other state.
"It see1ns to be the general rule, however,
that where no fraud or bad faith has been practiced upon the nonresident by his adversary in
a foreign state for the purpose of indttcing or e1·'tticing him to enter that state, irn1n1J;nity jrro1n
service of notice tuill not be allowed, and
service of notice upon a nonresident under such
circ~trnstances will not be set aside. 1\1ia:rn.i Po\vder Co. v. Griswold, 5 Ohio Dec. Reprjnt, 532, G
A1n. L. Rec. 464; Cavanagh v. Jy.lanhattan Transit Co., CC, 133 F. 818; Allen v. Whal"ton, 59 I-Iu:n.
622, 13 NYS 38; Olean St. Raihvay Co., vs. Fairn1ount Construction Co., 55 .i\.pp. Di-'7. 292~ 67 lr)!~~
1
G1'ncbn"~''D'
·)I)') I.,t1 A~ 1""
165 · -Emn.:ro
1 .\.., llf.r.O'
_..,LJ.f.,• ( ..) 0 • -rrc
"0.
:T - 0
, ........ ;:_), ._,fJ•~l ....
2~-12; Baker v. \:Vales, 35 1\Y Su;Y~r. Ct. 403, 3
Jones & S. 403; \¥atkins v. North .i\Jnerjcan Land
B'J Tin1her Co., 20 Times J-1. R. (Eng.) 5B4:, IT. Ij. ~'
(Italics added.)
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"l.J o cases have been cited by appellees holding that imn1unity from process vvill be extended

to a nonresident entering another state s:imply
for t1:e f>1JTl1ose of attc'rnpting to secure n scttlp_
r.1~nt of an action lle:nrl]ng therein, n:nh~r:~ jt i·~
e10i1..r fr0~11 th0 P7l(·1ene0 that the nonresirlrr-:t ,,,,rr~s
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induced or enticed to enter the foreign state
through fraud or had faith on the part of his
adversary. It is our conclusion from the evidence
in this case that appellees have failed to show that
appellant was guilty of any fraud or bad faith
in enticing the defendant Reichenbach to enter
this state on a pretext of trying to effect a settlement of the action pending in Page County.
"We are therefore constrained to hold that
the rule of immunity from process claimed by
appellees cannot be applied under the facts of
this case."
COXCL"GSION

In conclusion Respondent respectfully submits that
Appellant was not immune from service of process when
he entered the State of Utah to discuss matters of difference between him and the Plaintiff; that no public
policy requires the granting of any immunity to Appellant; and the finding of the court that he 'Yas not immune from service should be affirmed.
Respectfully subn1itted,

ARTI-ItiR H.

XIELSE~~

NIELSEX & COXDER

Attorneys for Respondent
510 Newhouse Building
Ra lt Lake City, l~tah
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